atp’s posterous

assemblée des troubadours phynanciers 

hai @sa: trader vic on oil, gold and qe (7 months ago!)

---trader vic et sa très intéressante théorie du de-stimulus.  il y a 7 mois en arrière.  mieux vaut tard que jamais! http://seekingalpha.com/article/127439-trader-vic-sperandeo-on-oil-gold-and-quantitative-easing ---

HardAssetsInvestor.com [HAI]: Top of mind for all of us right now is the Fed's so-called "quantitative easing." That certainly made all of the commodities markets react, particularly gold. What's your take?

Victor Sperandeo (Trader Vic): Well, two and two is four. I understand the movements of gold pretty well as a trader and as an investor, and as a fundamentalist - if you will - investor in gold. This kind of action is pure inflationary stimulus, which down the road is going to have a significant effect. So gold would be the obvious place to be a buyer in this newly created bubble in bonds.

It's a very logical step. I'm surprised gold's not over $1,000 today based on the long-term prospects. Now, you know, things don't work out as simple as that. But in the long run, gold is going to double from here for sure. For sure.

HAI: A double? That puts us close to $2,000. When you're talking long term, are you talking 50 years or five?

Trader Vic: The context that I'd like to put that in - because that's a fair question - is this: When the Fed is successful and the Treasury is successful in getting the economy rising to some degree, it will be accompanied by rising prices. And at that stage, gold will anticipate a great deal more inflation before the Fed can take this stuff off. So I would say it'll be concurrent once you see GDP start to rise. So it'll start to move - not in the same day obviously - but in the direction, once that occurs.

Now most people conceive of that event in the fourth quarter. I highly disagree with that. The whole bet here is on the money supply growth and fiscal policy. What they call a stimulus is really a detriment. It isn't going to help the GDP growth. And understand that - and I point this out because I've never seen it in print or mentioned once - lowering interest rates is normally a very stimulative event when banks can borrow money cheaply and are willing to loan and make the spread.

If banks are not willing to make loans - which they aren't today - lower interest rates have a harmful effect on the economy, because it punishes savers. Right now you could have $10 million in the bank and you'd be making less on your money than a bartender. No one's thinking about this. I'm going to estimate this ... this is not a firm number ... I'm going to estimate that in savings, with pension fund money and all forms of savings, if you will, that there is somewhere in the vicinity of $40-$50 trillion floating around.

If you lower interest rates from 5% to 0%, that's 5% of whatever that big number is for savings that somebody isn't getting. They, therefore, can't spend it. Right? So if they can't spend it, that's a de-stimulus. But meanwhile, where's the stimulus? Right now you go to a bank to get a loan, they won't give it to you; they won't give you anything.

Now I'm exaggerating: It is very, very difficult to get any kind of a decent loan. If I applied for a line of credit - a guy with no debt and I've got a substantial net worth - they really don't want me to borrow money.

Right now, they put off people like me by saying, "Well, give us five years of tax returns." Nobody likes to do that. So they have ways of discouraging you from really even asking for money.

They look at the gross aggregate numbers of rising unemployment, rising delinquency rates and rising bankruptcies. And if those are accelerating, they want to shrink from making loans, because they can get a percentage of those problems. So it's logical. If I were a banker, I'd be doing the same thing.

My point is this: The injection of cash is - down the road - stimulating and will be inflationary. Right now, there is a de-stimulus, which no one's talking about. And that is that lower interest rates mean lower spending, because people are not getting the money. You see my point?

HAI: Right, because it comes off the table in terms of the interest people collect, and yet there's nobody actually loaning anybody any more money, which they could then go spend. So we're in this sort of dead zone.

Trader Vic: Exactly. If you lower rates and you don't get the effect of the multiplier effect - people borrowing and redepositing, and borrowing and redepositing - you have a de-stimulus by lowering rates. So it's not as easy as people seem to make it.

But to get back to the specifics of your question, you will have inflation once GDP starts to turn up. You will start to get accelerating price movements. And gold will anticipate that. And gold is $2,000 at that. I'm not saying a straight line. But it's very easy for it to go there.

HAI: So if the money's not getting loaned, that immediately makes me think about the ags. We're told all the time that the agricultural markets really rely on liquidity from the banking sector to fund fertilizer, to fund production. Do you think that that means we see continued problems with production in things like corn and soybeans?

Trader Vic: Absolutely. Everything is affected. Not only that, of course, the government is going to stop subsidizing the ... according to Obama. So a lot of big farmers won't get subsidies. So it will make it harder. So that'll mean higher prices.

[…]

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james @gk: what PBoC does could end up being as just important as what the Fed does

--- voilà, il est temps d'updater vos bookmarks si ce n'est déjà fait: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/ article: http://gavekal.com/ ---

As Charles recently highlighted in The US Current Account Deficit - Part Deux, the crisis we have just lived through is unique. As in previous economic crises, the Fed slashed interest rates and unleashed a large amount of liquidity into the system, but unlike the past slumps, the US consumer did not take this liquidity and push it abroad through a widening US current account deficit. Instead, the US consumer and US financials used this money to begin repairing their balance sheets. Simply put, for the first time in a generation, the US current account deficit is not proving to be a key provider of liquidity to the rest of the world.... Instead, as we highlighted in What Will 2009 Be Remembered For?, China is. And for the first time, China, not the US, is leading the global economy out of recession. Which means that China, in this cycle, is the provider of liquidity to the rest of the world, whether through a narrowing of its trade surplus, investment in other countries' infrastructure (e.g., China's recent purchase of US$1.5bn in bonds of Indonesia's Bumi Resources), the purchase of foreign assets (typically in the materials/energy space), the signing of long-term contracts (with Australia for natural gas, with Saudi Arabia for oil, etc...). And thus, this time around, keeping an eye on what the PBoC does could end up being as just important as what the Fed does.

In the past, we have highlighted how China could tighten just as easily through administrative measures (e.g., anti-corruption drives, or anti-speculative measures in the property market such as raising the minimum deposit for housing purchases), than through monetary policy. […]

 

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rosenberg @gs: what's priced in

 

--- divergence d'anticipation de croissance économique entre les différentes classes d'actif? quoi? le marché des actions n'est franchement pas d'accord avec celui du crédit, ni avec celui des matières premières? https://ems.gluskinsheff.net/Articles/Breakfast_with_Dave_101609.pdf ---

At a series of client meetings this week, we stressed that there were fewer and fewer securities left in the market that were priced inexpensively. Ain’t that the truth. We re-ran our regressions with the latest tightening in spreads and breakout in equity valuation and found that U.S. investment grade credit is now priced for 2.5% GDP growth in the coming year (was 2.0% two-months ago) and the S&P 500 is now de facto pricing in 4.8%, which, by the way, is now basis points shy of what it was discounting in the summer/fall of 2007. And, backing out the fair-value P/E from the corporate bond market, and yields have been backing up sizably in recent weeks, we can see that the S&P 500 is now pricing in $85 of operating earnings, which we think will be, at best, a 2013 story.

Commodities are priced for 2.7% ‘global’ growth and are at least one ‘asset class’ that is priced for a muted recovery; though I would still classify corporate bonds as being within the zone of fair-value but at the expensive end of that zone currently.

As an aside, the consensus is looking for +2.4% real GDP growth in the U.S.A. for next year, and +3.1% for global growth.

Back to equities. Again, there was lots of excitement yesterday that initial jobless claims fell 10,000 in the October 10th week, to 514,000 — a nine-month low. Not that this isn’t good news — maybe payrolls will “only” be down 150,000 in the next go-around — but the stock market has basically moved at a rate that would ordinarily be consistent with a 350,000 print in jobless claims. In other words, the rally continues to move further away from the fundamentals.

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smith @nc: commercial vs. investment banks earnings

--- et ouais, pour ce faire des couilles en or post 2008, il fallait (1) avoir choppé le statut de bank holding company pendant la crise en évoquant le risque suprême de collapse intergalactique –statut traditionnellement réservé aux banques commerciales, càd celles qui prêtent de l'argent et qui du coup ont accès au financement de la Fed- et ensuite réfuter le business model de banque commerciale pour se concentrer sur celui de banque d'investissement –celles qui spéculent avec leur thune- mais tout ca government sachs et jp morgan vous l'expliqueront bien mieux que moi! http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/10/quelle-suprise-banking-profits-might-be-due-to-big-government-subisdies.html ---

Actually, despite the somewhat churlish headline, the story “Bailout Helps Fuel a New Era of Wall Street Wealth,” by Graham Bowley at the New York Times, is a solid job of reporting and does not tiptoe around the issue of the big bennies that the financial services industry is enjoying and their role in creating outsized profits. It also makes a distinction, which has escaped many writers, that the firms that are doing really well are the big capital markets players, not conventional banks (or firms like Citi and Bank of America, that are capital markets firms with very substantial commercial banking operations). It was the markets that the powers that be were panicked to save (debt is now heavily intermediated on over-the-counter credit markets, vastly less on bank balance sheets than it once was). And with the subsidies directed mainly at shoring up credit markets and the firms that own and operate the crucial trading infrastructure, it should be not wonder that the players that were most deeply involved are showing the greatest gains.

The reason for the tart headline is that this view should be conventional wisdom by now (well, it is among folks who understand financial services, but not in the wider world). And it should have been widely commented on when first and second quarter bank earning came out,. Instead the meme was “isn’t it wonderful those banks we thought were dead are actually making money!” No one wanted to look to closely and ascertain that the pretty profits were the result of government props, not sounder fundamentals. The one who came closest to saying the truth was Meredith Whitney, who described the earnings as “manufactured” (recall the role of AIG swaps unwinds in 1Q results) but added that the banks could keep it up for another quarter or two.

The New York Times story warm up indicates that comparatively few are in on the role of the government support in the supercharged profits. The price provides a short recap and notes that the Federal aid is contributing to lofty bonuses:

It may come as a surprise that one of the most powerful forces driving the resurgence on Wall Street is not the banks but Washington. Many of the steps that policy makers took last year to stabilize the financial system — reducing interest rates to near zero, bolstering big banks with taxpayer money, guaranteeing billions of dollars of financial institutions’ debts — helped set the stage for this new era of Wall Street wealth.

Titans like Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase are making fortunes in hot areas like trading stocks and bonds, rather than in the ho-hum business of lending people money. They also are profiting by taking risks that weaker rivals are unable or unwilling to shoulder — a benefit of less competition after the failure of some investment firms last year.

So even as big banks fight efforts in Congress to subject their industry to greater regulation — and to impose some restrictions on executive pay — Wall Street has Washington to thank in part for its latest bonanza…

Not all banks are doing so well. Giants like Citigroup and Bank of America, whose fortunes are tied to the ups-and-downs of ordinary consumers, are struggling to turn themselves around, as are many regional banks.

It is admittedly a high level treatment (for instance, it does not enumerate the various types of support, but does make clear it extends well beyond the TARP) but delivers its message in a clear, matter-of-fact, and unqualified fashion.

Some economists and bloggers have been on this theme (the extent of the subsidies and the lack of quid pro quo for the taxpayer) for quite some time, and their drumbeat continues. One salvo comes today from Jesse in “How Goldman Sachs Leveraged $70 Billion in Government Money For Record Profits.” While this is admittedly close to conspiracy theory, most investment professionals I know regard the latter phases of the stock market rally with great suspicion (too much end of day tape painting, too many heavy handed short squeezes, continued thin volume, and suspicious moves on indexes when they near levels that are significant to technicians). That of course begs the question, “If the market is being manipulated, how and by whom?” When I worked with the Japanese, it was widely known that the Japanese securities firms manipulated the markets and the politicians were tipped off early and bought stocks the brokers were about to ramp (look, if I as a mere gaijin heard about it, it was hardly secret). Yet when it came out in the Japanese media years later, it was treated as a huge scandal. I was and am perplexed that a widely-known practice could be treated as such a remarkable event. I regard much of this rally as a similar open secret, except how this is being carried out is a mystery (is this mere trader opportunism and brute force that looks like collusion, with the perps secure in the knowledge that the government won’t act against rule violations, since the outcome serves their interests, or something more deliberate?) [...]

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james @gk: the dollar sell-off and a strenghtening renminbi

--- ok, ok, j'achète. j'espère que je ne ferai pas bouger le marché du remnibi! http://www.gavekal.com ---

The usual suspects come to mind in regards to yesterday's US$ sell-off: 1) risk appetite is increasing; 2) the US$ carry-trade is being revived, as exemplified by a number of US$ fundraisings by emerging market companies (e.g., Vale's $1bn bond issue-see here), and 3) the (in our mind overplayed) worry that the Fed is debasing the dollar. Besides these explanations, however, there may be another major force behind yesterday's move-in a word, China. As we have mentioned in numerous reports this year (see The Return of Financial Sector Reform or The Policy Decisions That Matter Will Take Place in Asia), Beijing is undertaking a series of financial-sector reforms that will, ultimately, allow the country to accrue "capital productivity" gains. This process has been hastened by the global collapse in demand, because China recognizes that they need to replace the labor productivity gains that the export industry has offered over the past decades (workers moving from the field to the factory; imported technologies and management skills spreading from export sector to the broader economy, etc.). However, China cannot pull off financial sector reform while also denying its banks the experience that comes with international dealings. Thus we are also seeing increased capital-account liberalization, which in turn will subject the country's currency to greater market forces. That implies a strong a stronger Renminbi, and (as the market seems to fear) less demand for US$-denominated assets. This is a long-term, ongoing story, but in the past week the newsflow out of China has come thick and fast, while at the same time the Yuan is rising, hitting a four-month high. Consider just a few examples of recent headlines:

1) China increased the individual quota for foreign institutional investors into the A-share market: This move, coming on the heels of the A-share sell-off in August, sent a signal that China is supporting the stock market, and has no desire to withdraw liquidity from the system.

2) China Development Bank sets up a Rmb35bn private equity vehicle: Meanwhile, the head of Google China resigned to set up his own technology-focused private-equity vehicle, having collected funds from big names in global tech. These are on-the-ground reminders of growing momentum in China's financial sector.

3) Beijing to issue a Rmb6bn sovereign bond issue - in Hong Kong: This move is a follow-up on China's recent decision to anoint Hong Kong as the first off-shore center for Renminbi bonds. This will deepen the offshore bond market, provide a benchmark for issuers and may help to spur a more mature corporate bond market. Overall, it is yet another important step for the internationalization of the Chinese currency.

The issuance of an offshore sovereign bond has particularly caught investors' eye, because some see this as confirmation of a China plot to unseat the US$ as the world's reserve currency. But here we beg to differ. The US$'s status as the world's currency is not actually under siege, by China or anyone else (see Arthur's ad hoc here). China will not be fully opening its capital account in the next five minutes! The story here is a long-term, gradual one. But there is increasing evidence that China is committed to an external rebalancing and a reduction of the current account surplus. As a result, the Chinese currency will strengthen against the US$ over time-and big "China newsflow weeks," as we have seen in the past fortnight, serve to wake investors up to this reality. Nevertheless, just because China is busy reforming its financial sector, it does not automatically mean that the dollar will have to go to zero, especially against other currencies than the RMB.

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bookvar @tbp: what are banks doing?

---waow, bien inspirés de leurs amis colombiens, les ricains semblent avoir développé un nouveau model de machine à laver …  http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/10/what-are-banks-doing ---

The question of whether banks in the aggregate are lending or not gets partially answered every Friday when the Fed releases the assets and liabilities of the US commercial banks and if they are not, what they’re doing with their deposits. For the week ended Sept 23rd, commercial and industrial loans outstanding fell for a 12th straight week to the lowest level since Nov ‘07. Lending also fell in residential real estate and credit cards but rose for CRE. Whether due to a lack of demand and/or concerns with the economy, banks instead bought mostly US Treasuries, Agency paper and MBS (guaranteed by FNM/FRE) as almost free money from the Fed has created a nice spread. Purchases of Treasuries/agency totaled $31.1b for the week, the biggest increase since Oct 22nd ‘08 when panic resulted in buying of $79b. Agency guaranteed MBS purchases rose by $17.8b.

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berninger @berninger: something big is happening

--- …ou faudra-t-il attendre la fin des législatives allemandes pour que le feu prenne du côté de l'europe de l'est?   http://www.berninger.de/details/datum/2009/08/31/something-big-is-happening.html ---

European countries announce that they voluntarily increase the IMF´s funding

Alistar Darling announced an increase in IMF funds on behalf of british tax payers just hours after the German and French Finance ministers agreed to do so.

That indicates that there is big trouble on the horizon and "immediate" action is required in order to deal with it.

If current IMF funds of 750 billion Dollar are not sufficient to deal with new issues, then it must be the potential failure of a larger country.

At the same time we see tremendous movements in the Gold and especially the Silver markets. Prices are up, even though stocks still rally.

And in the US many expected that the FED announcement on bail-out funds receivers could damage the economy and lead eventually to a bank holliday.

All in all September seems to become a promising and exciting months.

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BoA: loan amendments potentially creates a bigger problem down the road

--- v-shape or w-shape recovery… or l-shape maybe? ---

In a recent research report. Bank of America Merrill Lynch says that recent loan amendments carried out to extend their maturity have been positive for credit investors, since without the amendment the borrowers could have defaulted. It says the average amended loan this year has increased its coupon from an original 220 basis points to 400bp, with an average amendment fee of 25bp and a Libor floor.

But the report argues that these amendments do not push out maturities far enough. It says most of the new maturities are concentrated in the 2012 to 2014 period, which already contains 85% of the maturities of outstanding loans. “In other words, extending these loans solves immediate liquidity problems today, but potentially creates a bigger problem down the road,” write the authors.

This does not apply to borrowers who have refinanced loans with new high yield bonds, since these bonds typically have maturities no earlier than 2016.

Recent amend-to-extends include Teck Resources, which extended a $3.5 billion bridge loan by two years to October 2011, and Jarden, which gained a three-year extension on its term loan from January 2012 on 18 August. Jarden’s amendment fee was increased from an initially proposed 5bp to 15bp. It also increased its interest rate from 175bp over Libor to 325bp over.

 

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stepek @lt: réglementation des HFs, UE et US se trompent de cible

--- au risque de me répéter: si les US et l'UE craignent vraiment les risques clichés de hedge funds, qu'ils commencent par mettre au régime leur banque centrale et leurs banques d'investissement! http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/b8abcf18-7fa4-11de-98cb-9d386dcf3f88/Les_projets_de_r%C3%A9glementation_des_hedge_funds_se_trompent_de_cible ---

Le tour de vis envisagé aux Etats-Unis et en Europe contraste avec l’attitude du régulateur suisse. Une différence qui pourrait encourager les gérants de fonds alternatifs à venir s’installer dans la Confédération

Les hedge funds et leurs gestionnaires sont de nouveau sur la sellette. La Commission européenne et le pouvoir exécutif du gouvernement des Etats-Unis ont, chacun de leur côté, soumis un projet de réglementation qui imposerait un contrôle direct de l’ensemble du secteur.

En ce qui concerne l’UE, le Projet de directive relatif aux gérants de fonds dits «alternatifs» (AIFM) vise à superviser plus étroitement les activités des gérants de hedge funds et de fonds d’investissement privés au sein de l’Union européenne.

De l’autre côté de l’Atlantique, le président Barack Obama a récemment annoncé un projet de réglementation de leurs activités aux Etats-Unis. Sa réforme les obligerait à se déclarer auprès de l’Autorité américaine des marchés financiers – la SEC – en tant que sociétés de conseil en placements financiers.

L’intérêt porté aux fonds alternatifs par les instances américaines et européennes découle des inquiétudes causées, à la fin de 2008, par l’endettement graduellement excessif du système financier ainsi que par l’impact d’un tel endettement sur le fonctionnement des marchés.

Depuis, la plupart des commentateurs ont compris que les hedge funds ne constituaient pas le catalyseur de la crise financière. Les organes de réglementation eux-mêmes – y compris ceux qui sont membres de l’Organisation internationale des Commissions de bourse (Iosco) – ont abouti à la conclusion que ces fonds alternatifs n’ont joué qu’un rôle mineur pendant la crise. Et qu’ils jouent un rôle positif sur les marchés financiers du monde entier, observation reprise par le régulateur anglais. En termes d’emprunts, il semble désormais communément accepté que ces fonds étaient et restent beaucoup moins exposés que la majorité des institutions bancaires.

Rétrospectivement, il est donc difficile de comprendre pourquoi les hedge funds sont l’objet d’un tel intérêt des régulateurs américains et européens. Bien que ces deux projets de réforme soient encore l’objet de débats, leur importance pour tous ceux qui travaillent dans le secteur ne réside pas seulement dans les détails de leur version finale. Elle est liée au fait, évident, que ces projets sont l’expression de l’attitude actuellement prédominante vis-à-vis des hedge funds à la fois aux Etats-Unis et en Europe, où se déroule la majorité de l’activité de ces fonds. Les deux projets ont été critiqués par les spécialistes du secteur, qui citent, entre autres problèmes, l’absence de consultation des entreprises concernées et le manque de compréhension de leur rôle sur les marchés financiers. Ces projets de réforme sont davantage le fruit d’une politique populiste que d’un travail de réflexion et de conception approfondi en matière de contrôle des risques financiers.

Cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu’aucun ajustement ne doit être apporté à l’architecture réglementaire du système financier mondial. En réalité, il semble qu’un consensus clair se dégage aujourd’hui quant à la nécessité de modifier la réglementation, mais il est impératif qu’une telle modification prenne en compte le rôle unique que jouent des hedge funds. Il semble ainsi difficile d’envisager la mise en place d’un système de réglementation approprié et efficace sans une étroite coopération de l’ensemble des parties intéressées. Ceci semble désormais compris par les régulateurs. Les engagements pris par les pays membres du G20 réunis à Londres au mois d’avril ont donné un nouvel élan à cet effort. De son côté, l’Iosco a récemment élaboré et publié de nouveaux principes de réglementation qui, à ce jour, ont été bien accueillis par l’industrie.

A la lumière de l’ensemble de ces initiatives, les projets de réforme annoncés à la fois par le président Obama et par la Commission européenne semblent, dans le meilleur des cas, prématurés, et dans le pire des cas, clairement hostiles à l’industrie des hedge funds. Sachant que ces projets de loi font suite à différents plans de mesures, réels ou potentiels, qui ne manqueront pas d’avoir une incidence significative sur le régime fiscal des gérants de hedge funds aux Etats-Unis et dans certains pays de l’UE, il n’est pas surprenant de constater que nombre de ces gérants envisagent sérieusement d’aller s’installer dans d’autres pays.

En réalité, la mise en place d’une réglementation additionnelle excessive – qui serait nécessairement coûteuse même si elle se justifie politiquement parlant – pourrait avoir des retombées positives pour la Suisse. En effet, le pays a organisé, à la fin 2007, des rencontres visant à rassembler les représentants du secteur, les instances de réglementation et les pouvoirs publics afin de renforcer son attrait et sa compétitivité auprès des hedge funds et de leurs gérants grâce à des réformes réglementaires et fiscales positives.

Concernant le débat sur l’instauration d’une supervision réglementaire directe de ces fonds, le régulateur suisse est d’avis que le système de supervision indirecte applicable par le biais de la réglementation bancaire des titulaires de comptes dépositaires auprès de hedge funds et des maisons de courtage de premier ordre est suffisant. Bien qu’il soit impossible de déterminer si la position du régulateur a changé ou changera à la lumière de la récente crise, rien ne permet de déceler en Suisse un mouvement populiste en faveur d’une réglementation directe des fonds alternatifs.

La question cruciale, pour le secteur relativement mobile des hedge funds, consiste peut-être aujourd’hui à savoir quels sont, parmi les différents pays encourageant actuellement de tels fonds alternatifs à venir s’installer sur leurs territoires, ceux qui sont capables de démontrer que leur gouvernement comprend et soutient une telle approche internationale et consensuelle. A cet égard, la Suisse semble très bien placée. Pour elle, l’enjeu n’est plus aujourd’hui de savoir si elle est capable d’attirer ces gérants, mais si elle parvient à gérer l’augmentation massive des demandes de la part de ceux intéressés à venir s’installer sur son territoire.

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jenkins @ft: securitisation reinvented to cut costs

--- que les acheteurs de risque apprennent à ne pas faire confiance aux agences de notation et à prendre leurs pertes, bon sang! si GS and BarCap veulent refiler une partie de leur risque, soit. et tant mieux si ce sont des privés qui l'achètent plutôt que le taxpayer qui se fera évidemment zober sur le prix payé! http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/47403c68-698f-11de-bc9f-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1 ---

Investment banks, including Goldman Sachs and Barclays Capital, are inventing schemes to reduce the capital cost of risky assets on banks’ balance sheets, in the latest sign that financial market innovation is far from dead.

The schemes, which Goldman insiders refer to as “insurance” and BarCap calls “smart securitisation”, use different mechanisms to achieve the same goal: cutting capital costs by up to half in some cases, at the same time as regulators are threatening to force banks to increase their capital requirements.

BarCap’s structures involve the pooling of assets from several clients into a secured financial product that can be sold on to other investors and rated by a credit rating agency, potentially reducing the capital allocated against the assets by between 10 per cent and 50 per cent.

These new mechanisms are in some respects similar to the discredited structured products, which were widely blamed for fuelling the financial crisis. But the schemes’ backers argue there are two significant differences. First, they involve the securitisation of banks’ existing assets, rather than of new lending. Second, bankers argue that the new products do not disguise the transfer of risk.

“This is the world of smart securitisation,” said Geoff Smailes, managing director of global credit solutions at BarCap. “It’s not securitisation for leverage and arbitrage purposes any more. This is all about restructuring portfolios of assets to achieve risk, capital and funding efficiency in a transparent and less complex way.”

However, some regulators may be wary of the invention of new pooled asset derivatives, especially if they are perceived as a way to avoid regulatory capital requirements.

Some rival bankers also view the schemes with scepticism. “This is a system of capital arbitrage,” said one senior banker at another investment bank. “The need for capital just miraculously disappears.”

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