rien de bien sérieux. une insipide diététique afin de gaver bulls et bears de notre bas monde phynancier. grass and honey au quotidien.
assemblée des troubadours phynanciers - grass and honey au quotidien's profile »
--- rien de vraiment nouveau, ni étonnant. ca reste toutefois fascinant de voir comment wall street a réussi à fournir du leverage de ouf (du leverage infini dans bien des situations) à des ninja (No Income, No Job or Asset) pour pas un sou! ce genre de risque était, jusqu'à greenspan et jusqu'à l'abolition du glass-steagall act, plutôt bien rémunéré et du coup parcimonieusement distribué… ---
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--- j'ai vraiment pas de problèmes avec tous ces politiques qui jettent la première pierre aux hedge funds… mais alors qu'ils aient au moins la décence de reconnaitre que les plus gros HF de nos jours s'appellent FED et ECB. et absolument, transparence nous voulons! http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/5863a7b0-3509-11de-9f29-16fc2f350645/Les_hedge_funds_la_mauvaise_cible ---
Souvent très riches, parfois surfaits, mais pas responsables de la crise, les gérants de hedge funds font pourtant les frais du premier pas vers une surveillance européenne de la finance. S’inspirant du sommet du G20, la Commission européenne a dévoilé mercredi ses propositions pour encadrer leur activité. Les acteurs qui investissent dans les sociétés non cotées, encore plus étrangers à la débâcle financière, sont aussi visés.
Le projet, qui devra passer devant le Parlement européen, va néanmoins dans le bon sens. L’enregistrement des gros hedge funds, auxquels sont demandés plus de transparence et un meilleur contrôle du risque, pourrait fournir les données utiles à la vue générale (macro, disent les spécialistes) de la finance, qui a manqué dans l’anticipation de la crise actuelle. Dans le même temps, les gérants de ces fonds alternatifs conservent une assez grande liberté d’action, si nécessaire à la fluidité des marchés financiers.
Rien ne dit pourtant que le projet de directive ne sera profondément remanié. Hier déjà, les critiques n’ont pas manqué contre des mesures jugées très insuffisantes.
Le débat menace de prendre un tour populiste, avec en toile de fond un affrontement entre Berlin/Paris et Londres. Certains politiques cherchent encore à trouver des coupables à la crise plutôt que de s’attaquer à ses vraies causes, qui se trouvent plutôt du côté du système bancaire.
La méconnaissance du problème apparaît clairement avec les hedge funds, car ils figurent en fait au rang des principales victimes, financières, de la crise. On s’attend à ce que la moitié d’entre eux ait disparu d’ici à la fin de l’année: l’an passé, ces fonds ont perdu non seulement de l’argent, mais aussi beaucoup de clients.
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--- waow, waow, waoooow, le bon vieux laisser faire couplé avec l'inaliénable rêve de fortune instantanée semble avoir gravement amputé le pouvoir d'achat des futurs et autres ex-retraités de la classe moyenne ricaine. boh, pas grave, si la vieille génération n'a plus un radis, yaka emprunter un peu plus aux générations futures! ---
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/04/60-minutes-the-401k-fallout/
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--- je peux trop bien m'imaginer la scène finale où, en tirant sur son cigare, hannibal geithner souffle à son acolyte looping steinbrueck: "j'adore quand un plan se déroule sans accroc!" (quoi que geithner me semble presqu'autant looping que steinbrueck…) mais que va faire la bonne nurse suisse? http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/83cfbb76-31b9-11de-8b45-00144feabdc0.html ---
Swiss President Hans-Rudolf Merz asked US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on Saturday to drop a legal case involving clients of UBS bank in return for a new tax accord the two countries are about to negotiate.
Mr Merz told reporters the new tax agreement would need to be adopted by lawmakers in both countries and perhaps be put to referendum in Switzerland, where it could stumble if the US tax evasion case was still hanging over UBS. ---waow, quel moyen de pression, n'est-ce pas?---
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--- en seconde partie –la plus intéressante- johnson, ex-chef économiste du FMI, discute le "quite coup" que les banques sont en train de réaliser. en intro, perino, auteur d'un bouquin sur le sujet, revient sur les pecora hearings des années 30, les interrogatoires vigoureux et efficaces des pontes bancaires de l'époque, qui selon lui avaient menés à la création de la SEC, et qu'i souhaite voir se reproduire dans le contexte actuel. ---
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/04242009/watch.html
SIMON JOHNSON: The one thing, though, I think we've learned since the 1920's just to add onto this very nice distinction Michael's making, is that anything gets too big, if it gets too big relative to the economy it's dangerous. Too big to fail. Thomas Hoenig who's the president of the Kansas City Fed said on Tuesday again [...] He said to the Joint Economic Committee something-- my recollection of what he said which I think is absolutely brilliant and really hits the nail on the head, is any time you have financial institutions, banks that are-- or also could be securities firms, that are too big fail, you're going to get oligarchs. He actually used the word oligarch which senior fed officials do not usually use that word. I think his point is a very good one, which is sensible regulation of behavior is what we got from the 1930's, and it was good.
BILL MOYERS: Sensible?
MICHAEL PERINO: Regulation of behavior. So, you're saying you have to disclose. You have to-- you musn't have the following conflicts of interest. If you had these other conflicts, you've got to tell people about them. So, your behavior is regulated. That's a fundamental approach to this. But, the problem with any kind of regulation, Bill is the regulators get captured, right? And that's a very-- that, by the way, is a very odd idea which comes in from the Chicago School of economics, which is, you know, the right and the left and the center are agreeing a lot on this issue here, which is very, very interesting.
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--- évidemment, tant que ce US housing n'aura pas donné le tour complet de son cycle, comment croire que d'additionnels dizaines de milliards de write-offs ne sont pas nécessaires dans toutes ces banques et assurances basées ou exposées aux US? comment croire que le caprice économique touche à sa fin? http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/04/housing-fair-value/ ---
Over the past few years, I have frequently referred to US housing as over priced and over valued by traditional metrics. These include:
[…]
Those who are now calling a housing bottom (despite having done so for years) are finding comfort in this mean reversion. They shouldn’t — and for three reasons. The first is that asset classes which become wildly over-priced do not merely revert to the mean — they tend to carom straight through the mean
[…]
Second, we know the recession plus a glut of foreclosed homes creates a “self-reinforcing cycle.”
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--- elle est bcp citée sur la toile. einstein en serait l'auteur. pas certain d’où sort cette citation, mais qu'à cela ne tienne, il fait bon la (re)lire en ce jour où la chute des retail sales nous rappelle que la crise est loin d'être résolue malgré le sympathique bear market rallye de plus de 20% de ces derniers jours… http://enadelascantaletas.wordpress.com/2009/03/22/ ---
Let’s not pretend that things will change if we keep doing the same things. A crisis can be a real blessing to any person, to any nation. For all crises bring progress.
Creativity is born from anguish, just like the day is born form the dark night. It’s in crisis that inventiveness is born, as well as discoveries made and big strategies. He who overcomes crisis, overcomes himself, without getting overcome. He who blames his failure to a crisis neglects his own talent and is more interested in problems than in solutions. Incompetence is the true crisis. The greatest inconvenience of people and nations is the laziness with which they attempt to find the solutions to their problems.
There’s no challenge without a crisis. Without challenges, life becomes a routine, a slow agony.
There’s no merit without crisis. It’s in the crisis where we can show the very best in us. Without a crisis, any wind becomes a tender touch. To speak about a crisis is to promote it. Not to speak about it is to exalt conformism. Let us work hard instead. Let us stop, once and for all, the menacing crisis that represents the tragedy of not being willing to overcome it.
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--- 2004-2009: fascinante ascension des banques chinoises venant briser l'hégémonie anglo-saxonne. mais quelles conclusions en tirer? ---
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ea450788-1573-11de-b9a9-0000779fd2ac.html
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--- ainsi donc le credit crunch n'aurait pas atteint le chinese domestic market. economic slump, oui; credit crunch, non. http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/03/31/54235/the-rise-and-rise-of-chinas-bond-market/ ---
As other major states face pressure with their sovereign bond sales, one country appears to be defying the odds — not only in size of issuance but success — China. As Merrill Lynch Bank of America (MLBoA) highlights in a recent report, the development of China’s bond market has been nothing short of breathtaking […]
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--- plus ca va et plus je me dis que l'oligarchie est un moindre mal en comparaison avec la bancocratie. au moins quand le prix du petrole s'effondre, les oligarques s'écroulent. alors que quand le système financier s'effondre, les bancocrates eux assoient leur pouvoir. mais que fait le peuple? http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123854120033275659.html ---
[…] The investment community was already suspicious last week when Secretary Timothy Geithner unveiled his plan, announcing that Treasury would select four or five companies as "fund managers" to purchase toxic securities. Given that the whole idea is to create a liquid market for these assets, we'd have thought Treasury would encourage as many players as possible.
But the bigger shock was when Treasury released its application to become a fund manager, a main rule of which is that only firms that already have a minimum of $10 billion in toxic securities under management can apply. Few hedge funds, private equity players or sovereign wealth funds come near this number. The hurdle would bar many who specialize in the very distressed assets that the Obama Administration is trying to offload from banks.
[…]
While dozens of banks and insurance companies today hold more than $10 billion in toxic securities, the vast majority are trying to get these assets off their books -- not lining up to buy more. As for asset management firms that hold such a big portfolio -- and are also healthy enough to serve as fund managers -- there is only a small pool, such as Black Rock, Pimco, Goldman Sachs or Legg Mason, as well as a titan or two of the hedge fund industry, such as Bridgewater.
[…]
We have no idea if Treasury is playing favorites, but it certainly doesn't look good. All the more so given that some of these big players may have consulted informally with the Obama Administration as it was writing the plan. Not to mention that the big asset management companies that are most likely to land plum fund-management jobs are also the ones that have been most vocally praising the Treasury plan. (Treasury declined to comment.)
None of this bodes well for the bank rescue. The purpose is to create new buyers for these toxic securities, a process that, in Treasury's own words, will lead to better "price discovery." The best way to accomplish that is with highly competitive bidding that includes any player with a solid track record in handling distressed assets. The weaker asset-holding banks are already wary of selling into this program, worried that low bids will result in big losses that will further hurt their balance sheets. They will be even less likely to take part if only a handful of managers, who have every incentive to keep prices low, are doing the bidding.
There is also the worry that Treasury is creating a new set of problems by concentrating these sold-off toxic securities into funds run by few entities. If this program is a roaring success, Treasury is guaranteeing that a select group of hand-picked firms are set to reap enormous profits, via a program that was largely underwritten by taxpayers. As it is, smaller players can now only take part in this program if they agree to "buy" into the funds run by one of the exclusive managers. So not only is the government going to be anointing a favored few to invest in these assets. It is also giving those favored few the opportunity to collect fees and profit-sharing from anyone else that wants to go in with them. In the wake of the AIG bonfire, Mr. Geithner is tempting another outcry.
[…]
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