atp’s posterous

assemblée des troubadours phynanciers 

hempton @bc: bair criminal or grotesquely incompetent

--- à chaque economie sa tare. mais quelle est la pire de l'oligarchie et de la bancocratie? http://brontecapital.blogspot.com/2009/03/sheila-bair-is-either-criminal-or.html ---

 […] There is a serious conflict of interest problem with the Geithner Plan.  These problems were first outlined by Steve Waldman in his “dark thoughts” post.  I noted that the application terms for the Geithner funds seem guaranteed to maximise conflict of interest.

 In short – if you have a small interest in a fund (kindly levered to be large by the US taxpayer) and a big interest in a bank you have a massive incentive to overpay for the assets purchased from the bank sticking the losses to taxpayers and thus increasing the value of your bank holdings.

 The defence of course is to have strict separation between the banks selling the assets and the Geithner Funds buying the assets.  Arms length separation is thus a basic and minimal requirement of the Geithner Plan.

 However Sheila Bair is now open to letting banks selling assets participate in the Geithner funds.  This was reported in the WSJhat tip to Clusterstock.

 I guess Sheila Bair can’t see a conflict of interest – only a “convergence of interest”.

However designing the plan to maximise theft is designing the plan to fail.  This is American politics – and rampant deliberate tampering with government procurement (ie criminality) is a possibility – but in Sheila Bair’s case I see only incompetence.

Comments [0]

johnson @atlantic: the quite coup

--- les livres d'histoire continueront certainement à mentionner pinochet, castro et consorts pour leurs coups d'état hauts en couleur. toutefois, gramm, paulson et toute la clique de la dirty dozen ne devraient pas avoir de peine à prendre  la tête de la tabelle des putschistes tant  l'envergure de leur coup est démesurée…   http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200905/imf-advice ---

The crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.

Comments [0]

durden @zh: upcoming eastern europe cataclysm

--- ahlala, que de lags… il en faut du temps avant que tout le monde soit contaminé de manière virulente! mais existe-t-il un système suffisamment sain pour développer les anti-corps nécessaires? http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/2009/02/glance-at-upcoming-eastern-european.html ---

As most eyes are glued to CNBC and the exploration of the huge financial problem at home, few follow just how bad the situation is at fledgling developing economies. With news of potential defaults out of Russia, Kazakhstan devaluing its currency and begging for handouts, and Baltic states (Lithuania and Estonia) on the verge of downgrade, things in Eastern Europe are getting from bad to worse. This is most obvious when looking at the foreign currency exchange rates of countries in the region: since September 2008 the Ruble has lost 32%, the Polish Zloty 37%, the Hungarian Forint 29% and Ukraninian Hryvna 42%.

 

What are the immediate observable impacts of currency devaluation (this may also be relevant for the U.S. soon):

 

1. Speeds up asset quality deterioration and write-downs as unhedged corporate and retail customers that have borrowed in foreign currency face a relative increase in their debt burden.

 

2. Borrowers may chose to withdraw local currency savings to transfer them into a more stable foreign currency, which would shrink banks' funding base.

 

3. The capital ratio of banks with large foreign currency exposure will fall as a consequence of currency devaluation-related issues.

 

So as the vicious cycle of risk aversion accelerates in more countries, it results in domestic economies becoming worse off, thereby making traditional international commerce impossible, and impacting larger beneficiaries of globalization such as the G7.

 

But that is not all: in addition to sovereign risk, external investors also have creditor, liquidity and cash repatriation risk. The is because many West European banks acquired East European banks in the course of of privatization of state-owned banks during the transition from planned to market economies. According to the Bank for International Settlements, claims of West European banks on Eastern Europe amounted to €1.3 trillion in the first quarter of 2008, which depending on the degree of contraction and asset write-downs could be significantly impaired.

 

As the chart below shows, the countries that stand to be impacted worst by Eastern European bank deterioration (by being domiciles to investing banks) are Austria, France, Italy, Belgium, Germany and Sweden, as banks in these countries account for 84% of Eastern European bank claims. And of these, Austria is most on the hook, as E.E. banks account for half of Austria's global bank claims. Specific bank names that have the most exposure include Raiffeisen Bank, Erste Bank, Soc Gen, Unicredit and KBC.

 

 

This presents the case for the unwind of globalization, which is worthy of a much more indepth analysis. Over the past 10 years, as the globalization and credit bubble went hand in hand, we will inevitably see the ripple effects of a globalization in reverse, marked by constrained trade relations and minimized international commerce, in addition to the expected problems of how to deal with a widespread increase of domestic corporate and sovereign defaults, and spiking f/x rates and deflation. The true shape of the global economic problem is only now starting to take gradual shape.

 

Indicatively, the CDS levels of some Eastern European countries have been the biggest underperformers in recent days, and some are presented below.

 

Comments [0]

alloway @ft: domino theory, eastern europe edition

--- perso je préfère le poker aux dominos. mais ce coup-ci, même si l'on sait que personne ne bluffe, la partie s'annonce intéressante...  http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/02/16/52476/domino-theory-eastern-europe-edition ---

Ukraine’s name, by some accounts, means “at the edge” - which is where its economy finds itself today. Austria’s finance minister warned last week of the risk of an economic “catastrophe” in the 46m-strong country triggering a “domino effect” of problems further west.  

Indeed, Austria should be worried. The country’s exposure to Ukraine, and other Eastern European nations, is impressive.

To wit, this chart, which we reprise from Zero Hedge, showing Western European countries’ exposure to their Eastern European counterparts (and yes, you can debate whether the Czech Republic or Kazakhstan for that matter qualify in the ‘Eastern European’ category, but bear with us here).

Hence we see rumblings like the one below, from Austrian finance minister Josef Pröll:

“Ukraine is a very important keystone country and we must avoid a domino effect inside the EU, if there is economic and political catastrophe in such a huge neighbouring country,” he told the Financial Times. “We don’t see this scenario developing now. But we must prepare and keep an eye on Ukraine.”

Fitch has already downgraded Ukraine’’s national long-term rating one notch to ‘AA’ on Friday. Bloomberg reports this morning that S&P is considering cutting the country’s sovereign rating too. Meanwhile there’s no news on getting the second tranche of a $16.4bn IMF loan, which appears in jeopardy as ministers struggle to meet the required terms and conditions, and spreads on the nation’s credit default swaps have blown out to over 3,000bp.

Anyone care for a game of dominoes to take the edge off?

Comments [0]

jake @epd: are we going to war?

 

--- à quelle guerre les US sont-ils en train de se préparer? ou jouraient-ils simplement les intermédiaire pour un quelconque autre pays en guerre? ---

 

 

Comments [0]

jpm @jpm: shrinking banks

(download)

--- sacrément impressionant! ---

Comments [0]

larsen @ft: UK bank bailout plan #2

--- d'ici qq jours les medias n'en n'auront plus que pour obama. la BOE a donc décidé d'abattre son second atout ce matin. larsen nous explique en quoi consiste ce second atout---

  http://www.ft.com/cms/84d2eba2-2a26-11dc-9208-000b5df10621.html

Comments [0]

garvey @ing: spain on creditwatch negative

--- et pour que même les petites gens puissent parier leur dernier $ pour ou contre l'abandon de l'euro par un des pays actuellement membre: http://www.intrade.com/jsp/intrade/common/c_cd.jsp?conDetailID=589672&z=1231880787189 ---

Another day, another move to negative outlook for a Eurozone sovereign. This time it is AAA-rated Spain that has come under the cosh. Back in better times Moody's led the pack by awarding Spain with a AAA rating in 2001, followed by Fitch in 2003. Then, Spain was moved to AAA in Dec 2004 by S&P.

 

Today, S&P has placed Spain on CreditWatch Negative (LIFO). Note this is more severe than the assessment for Ireland, which was moved to Negative Outlook. The difference is that Spain could lose its AAA rating within the coming month should S&P not receive information from the issuer that they deem worthy enough to delay a downgrade. The same story obtains for Greece, which was also moved to CreditWatch Negative and is thus subject to a near term downgrade. Ireland, it seems is safer for a longer spell as S&P monitor the success or otherwise of measures already being undertaken to rescue the situation.

 

This flurry of action from S&P is hurting the periphery (which these days means any issuer except Germany). All issuers will be looking at themselves, in the knowledge that underlying fundamentals will be very difficult to improve on in a recessionary state. Upgrade aspirants such as Belgium (AA+) or Portugal (AA-) will find S&P more difficult to please. Solid AAA-rated issuers such as France should be okay, but will have to be careful as it has the highest debt/GDP ratio of the AAA-rated issuers at 67% for 2008.

 

By the way Germany has concerns here too with its debt/GDP ratio at 65%. The Netherlands looks better here with a likely 50% debt/GDP ratio for 2009. Ironically, DSLs are not rated by S&P (due to payment disagreement). Austria is in between in the high 50's %, while Finland is relatively safe on this front in the 30's %. Important too that Italy manages to avoid too much fiscal turbulence in the period ahead.

 

The net impact of all this is twofold. First, spreads are under renewed widening pressure. Second, this weakens the position of peripheral issuers looking to come to the primary market. The convergence theme that had dominated in the early days of the year has been curtailed. That all being said, the liquidity advantage currently in the market remains, with over €30bn in coupons and redemptions being paid out this week.

 

In terms of secondary market activity and bid/offer environment, things have not worsened. Indeed, liquidity on this measure has held up reasonably well. Most of the widening has seen prices marked wider rather than actual end investor selling of spread. An environment of investors looking to buy, with good spread protection already in place, remains an underlying theme. But, there is less rush to get in now.

 

Germany AAA (stable)

France AAA (stable)

The Netherlands AAA (stable)

Spain AAA (negative)

Austria AAA (stable)

Finland AAA (stable)

Ireland AAA (negative)

Portugal AA- (stable)

Italy A+ (stable)

Greece A (negative)

Comments [0]

cookson @ft: top traders' hands

--- ben voilà qui devrait aider tous ces funds of hedge funds à reconnaitre le bon trader du mauvais trader… http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d15e5a18-e0d9-11dd-b0e8-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1 ---

Scientists will on Tuesday give banks a new tool for gauging the money-making prowess of financial traders – the lengths of their fingers. Researchers at Cambridge university have discovered a strong statistical link between the profitability of male traders at a London bank and the ratio of index to ring fingers on their right hand. The longer the fourth digit in relation to the second, the more money the traders are likely to make. This ratio, known as “2D:4D”, is affected by the amount of male hormone to which people are exposed while growing in their mother’s womb.

Comments [0]

varvel @gv: madoff's inspiration

--- no comment! http://www.garyvarvel.com ---

Comments [0]